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Abstract
Orbital debris remains as an obstacle to further space development.
While efforts are ongoing to avoid newly launched objects becoming
debris, the number of debris would still continue to grow because of
collisions. ADR (Active Debris Removal) is an effective measure, but
building a sustainable economic model for ADR remains as a difficult
problem.
We propose that the cost of removal can be paid by circulating
digital currency tokens on a blockchain platform whose values may
decrease and/or increase over time, issued by global cooperation (a
consortium) of parties interested in space development, in exchange
with proofs of ADR. The tokens pay their cost by themselves through
contributions by the token holders, who are likely to be benefited by
removal of debris. This scheme imposes virtually no cost to the consor-
tium. We have generalized this concept as POD (Proof of Disposal),
which, we believe, provides a more accountable foundation for solving
social problems with digital currency than many ICO (Initial Coin or
Cryptoasset Offering) in practice today.
We evaluated the feasibility of our proposal through a simulation.
We conclude that dynamic estimation of the economic values of each
ADR and automated pricing of tokens that represent the orbital debris
being removed are indeed possible. Actual prototyping of the proposed
digital currency system is ongoing.
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1 Introduction
Orbital debris is a threat to active spacecraft and satellites. Efforts are on-
going to ensure that newly launched objects will be properly disposed from
their orbits after their missions (PMD: Post Mission Disposal). However,
the number of debris would still continue to grow even under ideal conditions
of no new launches, no debris release or no explosions, because of collisions
among existing orbital objects including debris themselves. Therefore, for
further development of space, it is mandatory for us to conduct ADR (Ac-
tive Debris Removal). But building a sustainable economic model for ADR
remains as a difficult problem.
We see that a possible solution may be to design an economic medium,
learning from history.
Local currencies issued by local governments have been experimented
in the past, in order to make use of under-utilized resources in the region,
especially in times of depression. Well-known cases include experiments
in Wo¨rgl, Austria, in 1932, which made use of “stamp scrip” as a form of
money whose value depreciates, which helped the local government to invest
on public works at virtually no cost. This design may be a hint for us to
implement works of public interest with limited budget.
The first author of this paper has extensively worked on possibilities of
implementing and utilizing such currencies as digital media that can be used
on the Internet.
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Figure 1: Reduction-Over-Time and its Effects
Figure 1 shows the effects of depreciating (Reduction-Over-Time) cur-
rency tokens[14]. While it helps to reduce the debt of the token issuer,
a game theoretic analysis showed that depreciating currency is likely to
accelerate people’s spending. Being digital, such media can easily be re-
versed to obtain opposite effects. Figure 2 shows the effects of amplifying
(Multiplication-Over-Time) currency tokens[13]. An analysis showed that
this type of currency decelerates people’s spending. Applications of such
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Figure 2: Multiplication-Over-Time and its Effects
currencies have also been studied, for example, for post-catastrophic disas-
ter recovery[17].
Unfortunately, these ideas have not received wide acceptance. But situ-
ations are changing.
Bitcoin[8] is now well-known and an accepted digital currency. Another
example is Ethereum[2], under development and experimented widely, which
make use of “blockchain”, the record-keeping foundation first developed for
Bitcoin, as a platform of executing “smart contracts” as distributed appli-
cations. A blockchain, or a distributed ledger, is like a “promise-fixation
device in the air” that keeps records of promises, which can withstand par-
tial failures and churns. It can be used for implementing an unstoppable
monetary system because money is essentially a promise that its recipient
can also use it as money.
This paper proposes to utilize a new digital currency with planned de-
preciation to build a sustainable economic model for ADR. Then we will
generalize this concept as POD (Proof of Disposal), which, we believe, pro-
vides a more accountable foundation for solving social problems with digital
currency than many ICO (Initial Coin or Cryptoasset Offering) in practice
today.
Remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives back-
ground information on orbital debris and ADR. Section 3 shows the design
of a digital currency that promotes ADR by imposing its cost to users of
the monetary tokens. Section 4 evaluates the feasibility of the proposed
design of the currency by simulating issuance of tokens based on the real
estimations of collisions among orbital objects. Section 5 discusses poten-
tial societal influences and other applications of the same design. Finally,
section 6 gives conclusive remarks.
3
2 Orbital Debris and ADR
The instability of the orbital debris (OD) population in low Earth orbit
(LEO, the region below 2000km altitude), the “Kessler Syndrome”, was
predicted by Kessler and Cour-Palais more than 30 years ago[6]. Recent
modeling studies of the OD population in LEO suggested that the current
environment had already reached the level of instability. Mitigation mea-
sures commonly adopted by the international space community, including
those of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
and the United Nations (UN), may be insufficient to stop the future popu-
lation growth. In response to this new finding, an official IADC modeling
study was conducted in 2008 to assess the stability of the current envi-
ronment. Study participants were Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (ASI), British
National Space Centre (BNSC, now UK Space Agency, UKSA), European
Space Agency (ESA), Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The goal was to
investigate the stability of the current environment using the 1 January 2006
population as the initial condition. The 200-year future projection adopted a
“best case” scenario where no new launches and no explosion beyond 1 Jan-
uary 2006 were allowed. At the conclusion, a follow-up study, based on an
updated environment (including fragments from Fengyun-1C, Cosmos 2251,
and Iridium 33), a more realistic future lunch traffic cycle, and post-mission
disposal implementation, was recommended. Finally, the IADC designated
the follow-up study as an official Action Item (AI) 27.1, because of its po-
tential significance. The objective of AI 27.1 was to investigate the stability
of the future environment and reach a consensus on the need to use ac-
tive debris removal (ADR) to stabilize the future environment. Participants
included ASI, ESA, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), JAXA,
NASA, and UKSA. Details of AI 27.1, its outcomes, and recommendations
are summarized in [7].
In order to constrain the many degrees of freedom within IA 27.1, some
reasonable assumptions were made. First, it was assumed that future launch
traffic could be represented by the repetition of the 2001 to 2009 traffic
cycle. Second, the commonly-adopted mitigation measures were assumed
to be well-implemented. In particular, a compliance of 90% with the post-
mission disposal “25-year” rule for payloads (i.e., spacecraft, S/C) and upper
stages (i.e., rocket bodies, R/Bs) and a complete passivation (i.e., no future
explosions) were also assumed. However, collision avoidance maneuvers were
not allowed, as in the previous study. In addition, an 8-year operational
lifetime for payloads launched after 1 May 2009 was uniformly adopted.
Each participating member agency was asked to use its official, or best,
models for solar flux prediction, orbit propagation, and collision probability
calculation for AI 27.1. Collision probability calculations were limited to
10cm and larger objects. The NASA Standard Breakup Model[5] was used
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by all participants for their future projections, as it was determined that
participants did not employ any other fragmentation model. The partici-
pants were encouraged to conduct as many Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
as time and resources allowed to achieve better statistical results. Finally,
IA 27.1 conclusions were drawn primarily from the average results of each
participating model, determined through MC simulations.
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Figure 3: Effective numbers of objects 10cm and larger in LEO predicted by
the six different models. All models assumed no future explosion and 90%
compliance of the commonly adopted mitigation measures.
Figure 3 summarizes the projections of the OD population in LEO
through the year 2209, assuming no future explosion and a 90% compli-
ance of the commonly adopted mitigation measures, from the six models.
All models predict a future population growth. The average increase is
30% in 200 years. The short-term fluctuation, occurring on a timescale of
approximately 11 years, is due to the solar flux cycle.
Figure 4 summarizes the cumulative number of catastrophic collisions
happened within the 200-year projection period. Catastrophic collisions,
such as the one between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 in 2009, result in the
complete fragmentation of the objects involved and generate a significant
amount of debris. They are the main driver for future population growth.
The steepest curve (UKSA) represents a catastrophic collision frequency of
one event every 5 years, whereas the shallowest curve (ISRO) represents
a frequency of one event every 9 years. Catastrophic collisions happened
primarily at altitudes of 700-800km, 900-1000km.
The outcomes of AI 27.1 confirm the instability of the current OD pop-
ulation in LEO. They also highlight two key elements for the long-term
sustainability of outer space activities. First, compliance of the mitigation
measures, such as the 25-year rule, is the first defense against the future
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Figure 4: Cumulative numbers of catastrophic collisions predicted by the
six models
population growth. The need for a full compliance must be emphasized.
The 90%-compliance assumption made in the simulations is certainly higher
than the current reality. If the international space community cannot reach
this level soon, future population growth will be far worse than the outcomes
of AI 27.1, and it will certainly make future environment stabilization much
more difficult. Second, to stabilize the future environment, more aggressive
measures, such as ADR, must be considered. Remediation of the environ-
ment after more than 50 years of space activities is complex, difficult, and
will likely require a tremendous amount of resources and international coop-
eration. The international community should initiate an effort to investigate
the benefits of environmental remediation, explore various options, and sup-
port the development of the most cost-effective technologies in preparation
for actions to better preserve outer space for future generations.
3 Design of Digital Currency for ADR
3.1 Overview of the Design
We propose that the cost of ADR can be paid by circulating digital currency
tokens that depreciate over time, issued by global cooperation (a consortium)
of parties interested in space development, in exchange with proofs of ADR.
We call the body of cooperation the consortium hereafter. We call a party
that conducts ADR a remover. We call the monetary system we propose
the ADR currency.
Figure 5 shows the overview of the design of the ADR currency.
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• The issuer A is the consortium. The first token holder B is a remover.
• Depreciation in reality can be stepwise, such as yearly or monthly.
Figure 5: The ADR Currency
3.2 Initial Token Value
Since the catalogue of all observed OD is available, we can calculate the risk
of collisions. The consortium defines how the risk is calculated, representing
the international space community. Probability of accidental collisions is
calculated according to the defined function, and then the collision flux
is translated into a monetary value. All calculations are conducted and
published on the same blockchain platform on which the ADR currency
circulates, in order for all stakeholders to be able to verify that these are
correctly done.
In the translation, for example, the total cost of space development for
the past 60 years can be used. The monetary value can be divided propor-
tionally to the probabilities of collisions, which is iteratively re-evaluated as
ADR proceeds.
The initial token value is decided by the consortium according to the
following steps:
1. For each OD, the consortium periodically publishes the probability of
collisions and the estimated token value with its depreciation schedule
(the estimation expires after a certain duration of time).
2. A remover conducts an ADR (for the time being, a complete removal
is assumed for the sake of discussion), to which the consortium issues
a token.
3. For each OD, the consortium recalculates the probability of collisions.
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3.3 Depreciation
An ADR currency token depreciates as Figure 5 shows.
We would like to accelerate removal and decelerate the space develop-
ment while the number of debris is growing. Originally upon conceiving the
idea of the ADR currency, we thought that the value of the tokens may be
set to increase at first, to the extent allowed by the consortium, and when
the number of debris stops growing, the token starts depreciating, thereby
accelerating the industry.
However, the span for achieving the non-growth appears to be too long,
such as 100∼200 years. Therefore, we have abandoned the idea of accelerat-
ing removal and decelerating spending by increasing the token values for the
ADR currency (this idea is illustrated in section 5.4 for another application).
Instead, the tokens shall depreciate down to zero1 value over the duration
of time the OD is estimated to cause harm, limited by, for example, 50 years.
3.4 Incentive Compatibility
For a given OD, the higher its probability of collisions is, the higher the initial
token value would be when the ADR is performed. The longer the duration
of time the OD would cause harm, the more slowly the corresponding token
would depreciate. As a result, a remover would want to aim for removing
an OD with higher probability of collusions that would stay for a longer
time. The incentive provided by the currency design is compatible with our
intention to make future space development safer and easier.
The tokens pay their cost by themselves through contributions by the
token holders, who are likely to be benefited by the removal of the OD. This
scheme imposes virtually no cost to the consortium.
4 Feasibility
Evaluation of the effects of the proposed currency design will involve how the
industry and market react to this design, which is not objectively estimated2.
Instead, we evaluate the feasibility of the currency system by simulating
issuance of tokens using the actual catalogue data and orbital projections.
For the matter of discussion, we chose 3,866 intact objects in LEO, i.e.
uncrushed objects such as rocket upper fuselage or satellite platforms, from
the catalogue data as of April 1, 2017. The objects include operational
1If we decide that the token value does not go down to zero, it will have to be re-
deemed by the consortium when the minimum value is reached. When this happens, the
consortium will have to pay the value to the final holder of the token.
2Effects of depreciating/amplifying currencies have been evaluated in depth by simu-
lations with some assumed human behaviors in [12], for example.
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satellites, as we cannot distinguish between unused objects and ones in use,
unless the intentions are confirmed.
We divide space into 10
3
-kilometer cubes, and locate each object in a cube
at a given time. Then we examine whether each object has any neighbors
in the cube they are located or in any of the adjacent cubes (this means
that we consider a 10-kilometer cube for each object). If such a neighbor
is found, the collision flux is calculated according to the relative velocity of
the objects. We iterate this procedure with one-day interval for 50 years
in our simulated time to estimate the accumulated collision flux, or risk of
collisions, for each object.
Figure 6 shows the initial distribution of accumulated collision flux.
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Figure 6: Initial Distribution of Accumulated Collision Flux
We consider series of ADRs where an object with the highest accumu-
lated collision flux is removed from the orbit at a time. We approximate
the effects of an ADR by removing the corresponding item from the same
catalogue data and recalculating the fluxes.
Figure 7 shows changes of the sum of collision fluxes of all objects, and
Figure 8 shows the highest collision flux by a single object (i.e. the flux of
the removed object), over 50 iterations of ADRs as described above. We see
monotonous decreases in both values.
For each orbital object, we assign an initial token value proportionally
to its accumulated collision flux. To do so, we set the initial virtual budget
of 3.2 trillion USD, referring to our estimation of the total cost of space
development for the past 60 years, which is the debt the space industry and
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Figure 7: Total Collision Fluxes
the surrounding communities should be willing to repay over many years by
taking the depreciating tokens as payments. For the first iteration of ADRs,
we divide the budget proportionally to the accumulated collision flux of each
object, and assign the value as the initial value of the token representing the
object.
We consider two different policies for pricing for later iterations.
division policy:
We subtract the initial token value of the removed object from the
budget, and recalculate in the same way. Over time, the sum of initial
token values of removed objects will never exceed the initial virtual
budget.
coefficient policy:
We obtain the coefficient of translating the collision flux into a token
value from the first iteration, and use the coefficient for later iterations.
Over time, the sum of initial token values of removed objects may
exceed the initial virtual budget.
Figure 9 shows the highest initial token values (i.e. the token values
of removed objects) for the first 50 iterations of ADRs, calculated in these
two different policies. Note that in this work, these tokens are valued for
demonstration and prototyping purposes only, and the resulted token values
do not necessarily suggest how much each ADR should be valued in reality.
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Figure 8: Single Object Collision Fluxes
With division policy, we see that the highest initial token value may in-
crease as contribution rate of the collision flux of the removed object against
the whole may increase over time. With coefficient policy, on the other hand,
the price monotonously decreases, as long as the highest collision flux keeps
decreasing. For incentive reasons, monotonous decrease of highest initial
token values is preferred, because it would not motivate removers to wait.
However, we should note that this simulation assumes no collisions hap-
pening (thus assuming no increase of objects), and in reality, the highest
collision flux would not keep decreasing even with some ADRs. We may
need more sophisticated policy to realize the monotonous decrease of prices.
5 Discussion
5.1 “Proof of Disposal” concept
In addition to physical or engineering aspect of OD including intact object
described in section 2, the social aspect of OD and the proposed scheme is
considered in this section, for generalization of the scheme for other appli-
cations.
We try to understand the proposed currency system in terms of obli-
gation and credit. Once an OD is produced, the risk diffuses thinly and
broadly to all orbits that share the same space with the object. The re-
sponsible body for the object does not suffer any disadvantage except for
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Figure 9: Highest Initial Token Values
the thinly diffused risk. To make matters worse, the risk diffuses not only
spatially but also temporally. The temporal spread of the risk is, in other
words, a negative legacy from human space activity of the current generation
to that of the future generations. Every time an OD is produced, human
space activity of the current generation increases corresponding obligation
to that of the future generations, and in consequence, human space activity
of the future generations increases credit to that of the current generation
(Figure 10).
Time
Credit
Human Space Activity of
Current Generation
Human Space Activity of
Future Generations
Obligation
Production of Orbital Debris
Figure 10: Obligation and Credit
It seems impossible for a creditor in the future to recover the credit from
the current obligor. It is possible, however, for some third party to transfer
the credit from the future creditor through a present-day activity, namely
ADR. The third party to conduct ADR reduces the negative legacy through
the environment remediation, and therefore, ADR is considered equivalent
to transferring the credit from the future to today. The scheme is shown in
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Figure 11.
Time
Credit
Human Space Activity of
Current Generation
Human Space Activity of
Future Generations
Credit
Obligation
Production of Orbital Debris
Third Party
Digital
Currency
ADR = Transfer
Figure 11: Transfer of Credit from Future to Today
The transferred credit is a warranty for issuing a claim deed to be circu-
lated as a digital currency token. The authors have named this scheme for
issuing digital currency Proof Of Disposal, or POD in short.
The scheme may be applicable for any kind of disposal of industrial or
war wastes. For establishment of POD, however, the corresponding disposal
has to be performed under the witness of the whole community, in order to
prevent an untrue statement of disposal, and the knowledge of the disposal
is presumably to be shared among the community members through the
same blockchain platform that runs the currency system. From this point
of view, ADR is one of the most suitable cases for POD.
5.2 Practical Values of POD Tokens
But would POD (in particular, ADR currency) tokens have any practical
values, if they are issued by consortia of parties instead of banks, and with
scheduled depreciation?
Because ADRs remediate space environment for a wide range of applica-
tions including weather forecasting, maritime, broadcasting, telecommuni-
cation, airline and navigation, the consortium would actually involve many
companies not directly associated with space development. In return, the
currency system would attract lots of customers of such companies, who
would want to use the tokens to pay for the services (the currency acceler-
ates people’s spending by design), such as mobile communication fees, for
example. There may be a large body of the users who find practical values
in the tokens.
There is also a reason why POD tokens need to be linked with existing
monetary values. If such tokens are independent from other currencies, de-
preciation would not be effective for decreasing the token values as expected,
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because then tokens become scarcer, and more highly valued because of less
supplies against demands in relative to other currencies. Therefore, POD
tokens need to be pegged to an existing currency, such as US dollar. A
regulatory way to ensure such pegging may be to regard depreciation as
donation to the consortium (because depreciation does reduce the debt of
the consortium), which may be made tax-deductible in countries where the
consortium is considered a charitable organization.
5.3 Related Work
5.3.1 Economics of Orbital Debris
Both [1] and [16] provide economic analyses of the problem of OD. The
former proposes that classic Pigovian taxes on new launches would reduce
creation of new debris, and could also possibly fund ADR. But it would re-
quire cooperation among competing nations that have created the majority
of extant debris, and spontaneous deceleration of new launches would not
incentivize these nations. The latter argues that the most reliable solution
to the kind of problem is the establishment and enforcement of private prop-
erty rights, which they find infeasible in this case. It also suggests that an
institution to work on this problem would be classified along a spectrum
that transcends the private-public dichotomy.
Indeed, our proposal of POD is based on our understanding that the
solution would not come from the dichotomy but from the civil society.
5.3.2 Funding and Internet Technology
In recent years, a way of funding from general public through the Internet
has become a popular practice. It is called crowdfunding[10]. However,
crowdfunding is not necessarily a solution for implementing public works
where sufficient money is unavailable, as it requires money to be gathered
first. In the proposed scheme of POD, on the other hand, monetary medium
is created on demand on a blockchain platform.
Another way of funding that is becoming a popular practice is ICO
(Initial Coin or Cryptoasset Offering)[3], or a crowdsale of newly issued
digital coins on a blockchain platform. Although both ICO and POD issue
digital currency tokens, ICO is rather similar to crowdfunding, as it requires
upfront money to purchase the coins. ICOs tend to attract more people
more rapidly than crowdfunding, as people expect capital gains with an
anticipation that the price of the coins will go up in the future. Because of
this expectation, circulation as monetary medium is limited for the issued
coins in ICO (spending is generally decelerated). Thus, the issued digital
coins are not expected to help the community as a whole as means for
payment among community members. Another point about ICO is that
issued digital coins do not usually represent debt, so that ICO requires an
14
external scheme for monitoring whether the proposed project is soundly
ongoing or not.
5.3.3 Incentives and Attractions for Environmental Remediation
Plastic Bank[9] is another example of turning waste into a monetary medium,
where recycling plastic is rewarded with digital tokens issued on some blockchain
platform, in order to stop ocean plastic and help people ascend from poverty.
Plastic Bank incentivizes collectors of ocean plastics by paying them a pre-
mium on top of the market rate, using funds raised by crowdfunding.
This idea is similar to POD. But with POD, we can unnecessitate crowd-
funding, and distribute the cost of the premium among receivers of the issued
tokens, while spreading and promoting the idea along with circulation of the
tokens at the same time.
However, whether we use crowdfunding or POD, an important ques-
tion would be how helping environmental remediation can attract people
and change their behaviors. [18], for example, proposes a design inspired
by motivational psychology, towards more environment-friendly use of air
conditioning. [4] studies robustness of incentive mechanisms with bounded
rational behaviors. [15] studies the spread of social norms. We can learn
from those studies how to attract people and organize people’s participation
in our proposed solution to the problem of OD.
5.4 Other Applications
...
tokenNGO remover
removal witnessed max value
reached
zero land mine
achieved for the area
token
Figure 12: Zero Land Mine Currency
POD is expected to work where disposal is observed publicly. Another
possibly useful case is land mine clearing (Figure 12). This example uses
both amplifying and depreciating features of digital currency tokens issued
in return for disposal. First, the issued tokens amplify their values for both
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incentivizing early removal of land mines and decelerating spending. Depre-
ciation is delayed until zero land mine is achieved in the defined area, after
which the area can be reconstructed with accelerated spending.
5.5 Implementation and Prototyping
We believe that either Bitcoin or Ethereum can be used for implementing
POD. However, both blockchain platforms are under a risk of being discon-
tinued. If the price of the native token (bitcoin or Ether, respectively) goes
down, the maintainers of the blockchain (often called miners) may have to
leave the system, because the cost of maintaining the blockchain, which is
usually covered by rewards they receive in the form of native tokens, would
be valued more than the rewards.
To ensure sustainability of the ADR currency, which would have to con-
tinue for many tens of years, we take part in developing BBc-1 (Beyond
Blockchain One)3[11], a new open-source platform for record-keeping that
can use either Bitcoin or Ethereum (and even dynamically switch between
them) for proof of existence of transactions in its early stage (and later, it
will become independent). We are prototyping the ADR currency on top of
this new platform.
6 Conclusions
We proposed that the cost of removal of OD can be paid by circulating
digital currency tokens whose values decrease over time, issued in exchange
with proofs of ADR. We have shown that managing such a currency system,
the ADR currency, is indeed feasible.
We consider that OD is a kind of debt owed by the human race of existing
generation to the future generations. The ADR currency has an effect of
transferring the corresponding credit to the present-day. This concept can be
generalized for many social debts publicly shared, for starting and managing
projects for social goods using blockchain platforms.
This is also an implementation of a belief that for a currency to be
accountable, creation of monetary amount should be warranted by some
kind of value in the real world, as opposed by many cases of ICO. The
authors hope that the scheme we proposed in this work will be considered
as an alternative to crowdfunding or ICO for implementing public work as
blockchain applications under low budget conditions.
3 https://github.com/beyond-blockchain/bbc1
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